The recent release of over 600 prisoners on the eve of the Ethiopian New Year was publicly framed as a grand gesture of reconciliation—a bridge toward national healing. Yet, behind the official rhetoric lies a deeply alarming practice: the executive branch’s manipulation of judicial processes under the guise of "clemency." Rather than demonstrating political goodwill, forcing pre-trial political detainees to request pardons and sign self-incriminating conditional documents exposes a troubling erosion of procedural integrity, institutional independence, and constitutional governance.
At the core of this systemic failure is the deliberate distortion of legal procedure. Under standard Ethiopian criminal procedure—specifically reflected in Article 207 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code—the withdrawal of charges before a court delivers a final verdict is an exclusive function of the prosecution. It is a decision that must be grounded in public interest. It is not an executive favor, nor does it legally require an admission of guilt or a formal petition from the accused.
In stark contrast, a pardon (yikerta) is a mechanism reserved exclusively for individuals who have already been tried, convicted, and sentenced by a court of law. One cannot "pardon" someone who is legally presumed innocent. By demanding that non-convicted political figures, journalists, and activists sign confession-style pardon documents accepting criminal responsibility for unproven terrorism charges, the state violates the foundational presumption of innocence.
This process forces defendants into an impossible dilemma: remain indefinitely detained in pre-trial limbo or sign a politically loaded document admitting to severe crimes they were still contesting in court. Coercing pre-trial detainees to endorse their own prosecution transforms executive clemency from a merciful legal remedy into a tool of political leverage.
Equally concerning is how independent oversight bodies have been drawn into this transactional framework. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), tasked with safeguarding fundamental rights, found itself mediating five-month-long "shuttle negotiations" between detainees and the government over conditional release terms.
While facilitating the release of prisoners is a vital humanitarian objective, structuring releases around whether individual detainees agree to government-imposed pre-conditions turns human rights advocacy into a political bargaining process. When an official body acts as an intermediary for conditional political releases, it risks validating an extrajudicial system where constitutional rights are treated as negotiable concessions rather than enforceable guarantees.
The government has attempted to justify these conditional releases by framing them as an implementation of recommendations from the National Dialogue process. However, this argument misinterprets both the spirit and the substance of genuine political reconciliation.
The participants in the National Dialogue called for the unconditional release of political prisoners to broaden the political space, foster trust, and establish an environment conducive to genuine reconciliation. Instead, the government selectively implemented this call by applying arbitrary pre-conditions that exclude those who refused to sign self-incriminating documents.
Excluding nearly 30 prominent political figures and media professionals simply because they maintained their legal innocence and refused to sign pre-conditioned pardon documents undermines the core purpose of national reconciliation. True national dialogue requires an open, inclusive political landscape, not one where participation and freedom are conditioned on compliance with the state's narrative.
When executive discretion routinely bypasses established criminal procedure, the consequences extend far beyond individual court cases:
Allowing executive negotiations to dictate who stays in prison and who goes free renders court proceedings secondary to political trade-offs.
Imposing non-statutory conditions for charge dismissals sets a dangerous legal precedent, making freedom contingent on political compliance rather than statutory rights.
Using conditional releases to selective target detainees deepens public cynicism toward both the judiciary and state-sponsored dialogue efforts.
A state truly committed to peace and the rule of law must distinguish between genuine legal clemency and political expediency. If charges against individuals are to be dropped in the interest of public peace, the prosecution should exercise its statutory duty transparently and without imposing non-legal demands. True justice cannot be built on coerced confessions, nor can national unity be achieved through selective mercy.
